A N EVOLUTJONi\RY PERSPECTIVE revolutionized our understanding of behavior over a generation Jgo, but most tnental health clinicians and researchers still view evolution as an interesting or even thr~atcning alternative, instead of recognizing it as an essential basic science for understanding mental disorders. l'v1any factors explain this lag in incorporating new knowledge, but the n1ost important 1nay be the clinician's pragn1atic focus on finding ways to help people nmv. Evolutionary researchers have not found a new treatment for a single mental disorder, so why should n1ental health clinicians and researchers care about evolutionary psychology (EP)? This chapter attempts to answer that question. The greatest value of an evolutionary approach is not some specific finding or ne\v therapy, but is instead the framework it provides for uniting all JSPL'cts of a biopsychosocial model. Perhaps equally valuable is the deeper empathy fostered by an evolutionary perspective on lifl•'s vicissitudes. An evolutionary perspective does not con1pctc with other theories that try to explain why some people have ment.1l di~orders and others do not. Instead, iL a~ks a fundamentally different question: Why has natural selection left all hun1ans so vulnerable to 1nental disorders? At first, the question seems senseless. Natural selection shapes mecha-nisn1s that \vork, so how can it help us understand why the mind fails? It is also difficult to sec how it is useful to know vvhy we are vulnerable. Who cares why all humans are vulnerable to depression, when the goal is to help the individual who is depressed here and now? Surmounting these conceptual hurdles is a challenge that requires time and effort. Researchers and clinicians will n1ake the effort when they know ·what evolution offers to the understanding of mental disorders.
WHAT EVOLUTION OFFERS l'v1any ha\'C contributed to the grmvth of evolutionary psychiatry, but the contributions are in diverse sources and not ahvays consistent. Early applications of An evolutionary perspective on mental disorders: 1. Asks new questions about why natural selection has left us all vulnerable to mental disorders, questions with six kinds of possible answers, 2. Offers the beginnings of the kind of functional understanding for mental health professions that physiology provides for the rest of medicine, 3. Provides a framework for a deeper and more empathic understanding of individuals, 4. Explains how relationships work, 5. Provides a way to think clearly about development and the ways that early experiences influence later characteristics, 6. Provides a foundation for understanding emotions and their regulation, 7. Provides a foundation for a scientific diagnostic system, 8. Provides a framework for incorporating multiple causal factors that explain why some people get mental disorders while others do not.
ethology to mental disorders (McGuire & Fairbanks, 1977; White, 1'174) gave rise to mort> specific and comprehensive evolutionary approaches (McCuin· & Troisi, 1998; Pitchford, 2001; Stevens & Price, 1996; Wcncgrat, 1990) . Several books cover specific conditions (Baron-Cohen, 199~. 1997; Cilbert, 1992; Wcn<'grat, 1995) . while others take a more anthropological approach (Fabrcga, 2002) . Many articles address specific mt'ntal disorders, and some provide a new found<.llion for defining the categories that describe disordc'rs (Cosmidcs & Tooby, 1YY9; Wakefidd, 1992) . Mony chapters in this Handbook ,md many ,;eneral books about El' tackle one or another mental disorder (Badcock, 2000; Barkow, Cosmidcs, & Tooby, 1992; Barrett, Dunbor, & Lycctt, 2002; Buss, 1994 Buss, , 1995 Buss, ,2003 Buss, , 2004 Crow ford, Smith, & Krebs, 1987; Caulin & McBurney, 20ll1; Wright, 1994) . The ideas in these sources are too 1nany and too diverse to even list, but many can be summ.1rizcd in a list of eight fundamental contributions that an evolutionary pcrspectiH' offers to psychiatry and clinical psychology ( The task of explaining why \Ve are vulnerable to mental disorders is no different from that of explaining why we arc vulnerable to physical diseases. Tht' tendency in both cases l1as been to oversimplify the problc1n by attributing vulnerability to the limited powers of natural selection. ThesE' limits are important expl.1n,1tions for some disl'ases, but there arc five other posslblc reasons thut tlw body and mind are not better designed, starting with the mismatch bchvccn our bodies ,1nd our environments (Nessc & Willi<Jms, 1994; Willia1ns & Ncsse, 1991) .
Mismatch Most common chronic diseases arc caused by novel cnvironn1cntcd factors. For instance, atherosclerosis and breast cancer arc prcv<1knt now because our bod ics are not \veil dcsign(:•d for life in <l xnodcrn en\' ironnwnt (Eaton et al., 2002) . Whether rates of mental disorders are also increasing remains uncertain. An internationzd effort to gather prevalt'llet' data on mental disorders frmn 72,000 interviews in 1-l countrh~s (Kessler & Ustun, 2000) uses urban or rural agricultural sites. No con1parable effort is estilnating disorder rates in hunter-gatherer populations. This is unfortunate because such studies may not be possible in the next generation, but understandable because of the methodological obstacles.
Mental di~orders are often blamed on the modern environment. When reading and writing vverc first -spreading, Burton attributed n1clancholy to excessive study and "too little Venus" (Burton, 1624 (Burton, /1911 . Much more recentlv, retrospective data seemed to suggest th,lt depression rates were increasing r,1pidly with each generation (Cross-National Collaborah\re Croup, 1992) . l--fo-wever, data gathered using consistent questions in the same population over n'cent decades showl'd no such increase (J. M. lvfurphy, Laird, fv'lonsun, Sobol, & Leightun, 2000) . For drug <1nd alcohol problems, the story is more clL'ar-cut. The rapid spread of i!lcohol-making technology ch,1nged our \Vorld in \vays our species has not yet adapted to (Institute of Medicine, 1987) , although selection n1ay have increased the frequency of a defective aldehyde dehydrogenase gene Lhat may protect Asian populations from alcoholism (M. Smith, 1986) .
Infection and Coevolution
Infections persist because our every evolutionary ndvance to escape bacteria and viruses is mEJtched by their Ln faster evolution (A. S. Brown ct al., 2004; Ewald, 1994) . Furthermore, the ddcnses that protect us, espt'cially in1mune responses, tend to cause problen1s then1sclves. Some mental disorders mi!y resu 1t from arms races 1.vith pathogens and their <Juto-irnnTune :-;equelae. For instance, some cases of obsessive-compulsive disorder n1ay result fn}m streptococcal-induced autoimmune dan1agc to t11e caudate nucleus l.eonard, & Kie~sling, Fl94) . Prenatal exposure to infection n1ay predi.:-;pose to schizophrenia (lxdgL•rwood, Ewald, & Cochran, 200:1) cls suggested by incre<lsed rates of schizophrenio in babies born during influenza epidelnics (Kunugi et al., 1995) <1nd a sevenfold risk increase for babies born to motl1ers who had influenza during tlw first trinwstcr (A. S. Brown ct al., 2004) . Infectious causes h;we been proposed for a wide range of nwntal disordt'rs, especially affective disorders (Ewilld, 2000) .
A mort' insidious result of rapid coevolution arises fron1 con1petition within our species that induces more and mon' t>xtreme traits, especially thosl' th<1t lead to winning social con1pctitions (All'x,1ndcr, 197-!-; Humphrey, 1976; Whiten & Byrne, 1997) . If sexual selection has shaped mental traits (Miller, 2000) , this could account for vulnerability to certain disorders, espl'cially thuse associated with creativity (Rich8rds, Kinner, Lunde, & Bt'net, 19.S8; ShanL'r, Miller, & Mintz, 2004) . Even aside from cmnpcting for p<1rtncrs, competing for status absorbs vast human energy (Bj]rkow, 1989; Veblen, UN9) and gives rise to much suffL-ring from cn1.Ty and the ncgntlve emotions associ;1ted with f<1ilures (Gilbert, Price, & /\Ilen, 1995) . Such emotional tendt'ncies might well result from arms races that often lcmTe us in zero-sum competitions (Fr(]nk, lSJ99).
Tmde-0/}~s
Design trc1de-offs makL' pcrft•ction in1possible for any trajt, natural or hun1an n1ade. A car that gets 60 miles pt'r gallon will not get to hO milt's per hour in 6 seconds. Wt' humans could run faster if our legs were longt>r, but our bones vvould be Inon• fr<1gile. \Ve could han:' lt•ss anxiety, but only at the cost of being more likt'l.Y to be injured or killed.
Constraints Systen1s shaped by natural selection are subject to several special constraints, especially path dependence. For instance, we are stuck with eyes '".rhose vessels and nerves run between the light and the retina. Furthern1ore, in contrast to consciously created designs, biological designs are products of selection that involve lilnited options, random effects, inaccurate transmission of the DNA code, and the vagaries of intPraction effpcts with difft>rent environments. Far from a.:-1suming that everything it'i adaptive, an evolutionary approach calls attention to defective and substandard designs that result from multiple trade-offs, constraints, and errors.
SelccUon Is for Reproductive Success, Not Health Many imagine that selection
shapes bodies zmd minds that arc healthy, long-lived, and coopcratiVl'. It does, wl1E'n those traits increase reproductive SUCCC'SS (RS). HowenT, cl gene that decreases health, longevity, or coopl'rativeness \vill nonetheless spread if it increases RS. Such genes are likely responsible for many of our least valued characteristics, such as bitter competition, envy/ greed, and unqut·nchable sexual desire and jealousy (Buss, 2000) . The djfferl'nces between the seAL'S arise largely because different reproductive stratE'gics shape different physic1l and n1cntal traits, even at the expense of longevity and individual well-being: (Cronin, 1991; Daly & Wilson, 1983; Geary, 1998; Kruger & Ncsse, 2004) .
Dcfcn::;cs Pain, cough, fever, and other protective responses are unpleasant but useful responses that protect us from dangl'r and loss. The prevalent tendency to confuse these defenses with disease's <Jnd defects has been called "The Clinician's lllusion" (Ncsse & Williams, J994) . Most physicians knmv that cough and infldmmation are adaptations, but the utility of fl'\rcr, diarrhea, and anxiety is less widely rccoh:rnized. A naYve view sues our vulnerJbility to neg;1tive emotions as examples of poor design. But notural selection does not care <1 fig for our happiness; it just mindkssly shapes whatever emotional tcndenciL'S incrc'ase RS (Nessc, 1991n; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) . While positive emotions are useful in situations whefl' energy and risk-taking pay off (Fredrickson, 1998) , they ciln be fataJ in dangerous situations (Ncssc, 2004) .
Summing Up Six Causes Smne evolutionary approaches to mental disorders emphasize one of the preceding six possible explan<ltions. For instance, some authors attribute much psychopathology to living in a modern environment (Clantz & Pearce, 1989); others emphasize infection (Ewald, 2000) , constraints, tradc-offs, or poth dependencies (Crow, 1997; Horrobin, 199K) . Others propose thot mental disordL'rs persist because of fitness benefits, even for conditions such as schizophrenia (J. S. Allen & Sarich, 1988; Shaner et ol., 2004) , bipolar disorder (Wilson, 1998) , and suicide (dcCatanzaro, 1900) . The resulting confusion is substantial for those in the field and overwhelming for others.
\.Vhik the hum;:m mind prefers monoc<~us;:d explanntions, a full evolutionary explanation for onl' disorder may include scVL'ral different factors. For l'xamplc, vuhwrability to depression may CJrisc from novel aspects of modern life, fron1 infection, from constraints and trade-offs/ zmd because lcnv n1ood may be a defense that can increase RS at the expense of }Wrsonal happiness. Par frnm offering a silnplistic approach to the causes of mental disorders, an evolutionary perspective provides a framework for organizing the genuine complexity into a biopsychosocial perspective (Weiner, 1998) .
BEHAVIOR AND EMOTIONS
When a patient comes to the gl'neral1nedical clinic with cough or kidney failure, the physician knows that cough is a protective response and that the kidney filters out toxins and rq;ulates salt and \Vater babncc. By contr,lst, when a p<ltient comes to a mental health clinic ·with a phobia, the utility of anxiety may never be considl'rcd. VVhen someone conws with jealousy, consideration of its normal functions is unlikdy. Mental health profession<Jls l<1ck <1 body of knowledge about normal emotional functions comparable to the understanding physiology offers to general medicine. EF is beginning to provide this missing body of knowlcdgC', as shmvn by tlw chapters in this 1-landbook, and by evolutionary perspectives on motivation (French, Kamil, & Leger, 2000) , emotion (Plutchik, 2003) , and specific topics such as grid (Archer, 19Y9).
UNLJEHSTAND!NC I0.iDIV!UUAL LJvJ:s EP can bring information about an individual's idiosyncratic values, goals, and life situations into a scientific framework. Consider John, a dt>pressed 20-year-old man \Vho \vorks two jobs in local stores to support his disabled metlwr.-Whcn he vvc1s 14, his dying father made him promise to t<.1kc care of his mother always. He has been doing th<Jt ever since, but with increasing resentment and depression. These three sentt>nces give more insight into his depret'ision than a dozen derno-gr<lphic variables and a brain scan. An evolutionary understanding of motivation can begin to bring such inform<ltion into a nomothetic fraJnC'work based on bchaviural ecology categories of life history effort. Tlw tradc-offs among these catcgorh.'s are as universal as tlwy arc problL'mc1tic (Krebs & Davies, 1984; Stearns, 1992) . No solution can be perfect, and tht' conflicts account for much human suffering (Chisholm, 1999; Low, 2000; E. A. Smith & Wintcrhalder, 1992; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999) . UndL'rstanding these tradc-offs fosters realistic clinical thinking <1nd enhances empathy for the vicissitudes of people's lives.
REL;\TJC)NS!-!JPS
EP's greatest contribution may be a deeper understanding of rebtionships. For instance, Bmvlby's (1969) insights about the evolutionary functions of attachment have been extended by suggestions that apparently "abnormal" kinds of attachnwnt may represent alternativL' strategies for infants to get resources fron1 mothL'rs in difficult circumstances (Belsky, ]999; Chisholm, 1Y96) and a deeper understanding of women's n'productive stratt.~gies in gerwral (Hrdy, 1999) . Analysis of mutually beneficial re-ciprocal exchanges has led to extensive studit>s of econmnic games (Fchr & Fischbaclwr, 2003) that illuminate the origins of the social en1otions (Fessler, in press; Fiske, 1992; Henrich & Cil-Whitc, 2001 ). Hmve\'tT, interpreting all human relationships as calcubtc•d exchanges ignores aspects of human behavior that are essential to understanding n1ental disorders, such as our capacities for moral action and the emotions of pride and guilt (Katz, 2000) . Selection n1ay have shaped capacities for conunitment that are superior to rational calculation (Frank, 1988; Gintis, 2000; Nesse, 2001a) .
Psychodynamics Freud's theories are ridiculed because some are wrong and because psychoanalysis is not reliably effective. However, the reality of repression is a profound fact of human nature that needs an evolutionary explanation (Badcock, 1988; Sulloway, 1985) , along with phenomena such as the Oedipus complex ! Ericson, 1993) . Trivers and Alexander separately suggested that self-deception is a strategy for deceiving others (Alexander, 1975; Trivers, 1976 Trivers, , 2000 , but people also may repress the sins of others to preserve valuable rC'Iationships (Nesse, 1990b) . Closely related is Trivers's (1974) insight that regression may be an effective strategy used by offspring to manipulate their parents into providing resources that would be appropriate only if they were younger or sick. His more general theory of parent-offspring conflict is the neglected foundation for understanding many childhood disorders. Attempts to provide an evolutionary foundation for psychodynamics are developing (Badcock, 1988; Slavin & Kriegman, 1992; Sulloway, 1985) but remain relatively unappreciated by psychoanalysts, perhaps because an evolutionary view fosters skepticisn1 that undermining repression will be helpful routinely (Slavin & Kriegman, 1990 & Rutter, 1993) . In the midst of a burst of interest in facultative developmental mechanisn1s and their role in evolution (Hall, 1998; West-Eberhard, 2003) , evolutionary psychologists have begun looking for mechanistns that use environment inputs to adjust developmental pathways. An obvious facultative adaptation is the regulation of female reproductive onset by fat stores (Surbey, 1987) . Less well supported are proposals that early father absence induces early reproduction (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Draper & Harpending, 1982; Surbey, 1990) . A possible adaptation with particular relevance for mental disorders is the adjustment of the gain in the hypothalamic pituitary axis system in response to early stress and the transmission of this sensitivity across the generations by maternal influences on fetal brain development (Essex, Klein, Eunsuk, & Kalin, 2002; Teicher eta!., 2003) .
EMOTIONS AND THE ElVIOTIONAL DISORDERS
Most mental disorders are emotional disorders. People come for treatment because they experience anxiety, deprl'Ssion, anger, or jealousy. Many assume that such negative emotions are abnormal, but they are usefut at least for our genes. People with depression and anxiety are so obviously impaired that it is difficult to see how such emotions could be useful. However, selection has shaped emotion regulation mechanisms that often give rise to normal but useless suffering (Nesse, 2004 (Nesse, , 2005 ). An evolutionary foundation for studies of emotions is now routine (Ekman, 1992; Nesse, 1990a; Plutchik, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) and recognition is growing that en1otions are special states shaped by selection to give advantages in fitness-significant situations that have recurred over evolutionary tilne.
OJ/\CNOSIS
When is an e1notion abnonnal? The criteria for psychiatric diagnoses are based on intensity, dur.:Jtion, and associated disability (American Psychiatric Association, ] 994). The extremes are abnormal, but without knmving the functions of emotions, the line between normal and abnormal re1nains subjective (D. Murphy & Stich, 2000; Ncsse, 2001b; Troisi & McGuire, 2002; Wakefield, 1992) . The lack of an evolutionary foundation fosters serious errors including describing continuous emotions as categories and neglecting abnormal conditions characterized by excess positive or deficient neg<ltive enwtions. Jn addition, diagnostic criteria do not consider the appropriateness of an emotion to the situation. If general nwdicinc n1ade diagnoses according to the strategy used in psychiatry, it would diagnose abnormal cough disorder based on cough frequency and severity without considering \Vhcther the cough \va;.; a norma] response in certain situations. Far from genuine] y atlworetical, the Diag1wstic and Stati~tical Mmwal (~f Mental Disorders sys-tL'l11 (DSi\1; A1nerican Psychi,1tric Association, J994) fosters a crudt' biological view (Horwitz, 2002) .
Many agree that the DSM system inhibits understanding (Phillips, First, & Pincus, 2003) , and several authors have suggested hmv evolutionary principles can help to m,1kc diagnosPs more scientific. D. Murphy and Stich (2000) take}he DSM to task for its atheoretical approach and suggest distinguishing disorders that arise from brain abnormalities from those that arise from normal brains exposed to novd C'nvironmcnts. Tlwy propose categories based on the presumed modularity of cognitive design. VVakefield (1992) offers a strong critique of the DSM, using tlw concept of "harmful dysfunction" to clarify what is and is not a disorder. This sophisticatL·d evolutionary analysis of psychiatric diagnosis argues that it is essentiJ.l for mental as well as physical disorders to separate normcll from abnormal phenomena based on whether thl'y arc h<umful and whether tlwy arise from a dysfunction. This sophisticated understanding of evolutionary function is the scientific foundation for future psychi<1tric diagnostic systems (Wakefield, this volume).
An C\'olution,uy view highlights the central flJw in the DSM criteria; they do not rcfll'ct the most basic distinction in medical diagnosis: that between diseases and symptoms of diseases. Negative emotions such as anxiety and sadness cue useful ciJpacitics shaped by natural selection. Determining \Vhen they are abnormal requirL'S undt>rstanding when <1nd hmv they are u~eful.
An approach based on Darwinian medicine, following Wakefield, suggests global cakgories of mental problems based on ansv~T·rs to three questions: (1) Are cognitive and brain mc'chanisn1s normal or defective? (2) Do the symptoms arise frmn non' I aspects of the environment, <lnd (3) Are the symptmns in the interests of the individual, his or her genes, or neither? The rC'sulting categories are:
1. Emotional, cognitive, or behavioral responses that arise from normal systl'lns:
a. Useful responses that miJy be a\'ersivc (ordinary anxiety and anger). b. Normal responses that bl'ncfit the individual's gcnl's, at the expense of the individual's interests.
c. Responses that arise from norn1al system but that are not useful in the particular instance. d. Nonnal responses that are useless or harmful now but would not have been in the ancestral environment. e. Normal responses that do not harm the individua I but that are defined as abnormal by a group or culture. 2. Sy1nptoms arising from abnormal regulation of a normal emotion or cap<Kity.
a. Specific defects, genetic or acquired, account for the dysrcguL1tion (causation from below, hardware problems). b. Dysregulation arising from soci;1l dilemmas or complexities (c<1tJSiltion from abovL', software problems). c. Extremes of a trait distribution that increJse vulnerability. 3. Abnormalities of behavior, cognition, and emotion that arisL' from fundanlental brain or cognitive abnormalities not pri1narily involved vvith systems that regulate emotion and behavior (e.g., lead poisoning).
INDIVIDUAL DrFFERFNC'ES
Most psychiatric research attcn1pts to explain individual differences. Despite growing agreement on the importance of gene-environment intcroctions (Kendlcr, Kuhn, & Prescott, 2004; Ridky, 2003; Rutter & Rutter, 1993) , m<>jor disagreenwnls persist about why some people get ill and others do not. Different authorities L'mphasize different causal factors (gem,tic, developmental, situational, t•tc.). Far from emphasizing genetic differences, an evolutionary view provides a framl'\Vork that highlights the relationships among all fJctors and levels. 1t also contributes strategies for avoiding some simple n1istakes. Much misunderstanding arises from confusing attempts to explain the existence of a trait with attempts to explzlin variations in a trait. It is scnsclt•ss to ask whetlwr a rectangle is caused 1norc by its length or its width. However, rect,1ngles can vary in area only if their width or length (or both) chrmges. LikcwisL>, variutions among individuals can result only from diffl'rc•ncf's in gl~IWS, differences in environments, and the interactions between thcn1. The proportion of variance <1ttributablc to each component is not fixed, but varies dl'pL'nding on tlw particular environment and the range of genotypes. Preoccupation wdh n<lture versus nurture has distracted atkntion from the tnany different routes to <J disorder. An evolutionary approach fosters simultaneous cont>idt•ration of the m,1ny fc1ctors that may explain individual variation in a trait, some of which <lrc listed in Table 32 .2.
The task of accounting for individual differences should not bL' reduced to <trguing about the relative importancl' of one factor compared tu another. It is, instead, the challenge of explicating how each contributes to individual diffl'rencl's in a particular trait and how their contributions to a particuLn trait m;1y be different not only between families, populations, or cultures, but even bet'\Vel'n individuals. The responsible factors may be mainly genetic in one individual and tnainly environmental in another. This has practical implic,ltions for mentol health research. For instance, we need to take SL'riously the possibility that 1nany different genes contribute to depression vulnerability by many d_ifferent routes. Table 32 .2 Twelve Sources of Individual Differences 1. Additive genetic differences among individuals that result in phenotypic differences (in this environment) 2. Variation resulting from Gene x Environment interactions 3. Variation resulting from Gene x Gene interactions 4. Assortative mating-nonrandom mating increases or decreases trait variance 5. Random factors in development, such as the stochastic paths of neuron migration 6. Effects of cues that influence development via facultative mechanisms to a trajectory suited to the particular environment, such as early heat exposure influencing the number of adult sweat glands 7. Effects of trauma, toxins, and other environmental exposures outside the range of normal that damage the organism or distort its development 8. Effects of environmental factors that influence the organism "top~down" via percep~ tual experience without resulting in damage or acting via a specific facultative mechanism 9. Effects of environmental factors that influence the organism from the "bottom-up" that are neither damaging nor mediated via facultative adaptations 10. Effects of individual learning that facilitate flexible coping with current aspects of the environment 11. Experiences shared within a culture that are incorporated into values and emotional proclivities that may be difficult to change later (such as values or sexual attitudes) 12. Experiences shared within a culture whose effects account for variation that changes readily when conditions change
SPECIFIC DISORDERS
An evolutionary perspective calls attention to a distinction that is fundamental and well recognized in 1nost of medicine, but unaccountably neglected in psychi~ a try. Son1e 1nedical conditions, such as cancer and epilepsy, are diseases that arise from some abnormality in the body's mechanisms, while others, such as pain and cough, are protective responses. Some mental disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism, are allnost certainly specific diseases or clusters of diseases, while others, such as depression and panic disorder are fundamentally different in that they are useful protective mechanisn1s, albeit ones that readily go awry. Not all mental disorders are c1notional disorders, but n1any are, and they deserve consideration together.
EMOTIONAL DISORDERS
Most mental disorders are emotional disorders, but they are not yet based on knowledge about the origins and functions of emotions. Instead, intense or prolonged negative emotions are said to be abnormal, irrespective of the situation, while deficits in negative emotions and excesses of positive emotions are rarely recognized as disorders. An evolutionary perspective provides a n1ore balanced view.
Anxiety Disorders Although anxiety can be usefut a dry mouth and tre1nor when standing before a large group seem worse than ust:'1ess. Likewise, the symptoms of panic may help escape fron1 a lion, but they are unhelpful in a grocery store. We novv have a vast amount of knowledge about the responsible brain n1echanisms, but no comparable body of knowledge about the evolutionary origins and utility of social anxiety or panic (Nesse, 1987) . Similarly, hundreds of studies document every aspect of excessive anxiety states, but only a handful look for states of deficient anxiety, the hypophobias (Marks & Nesse, 1994) . One study tried to confirm that fear of heigbts often results from severe falls early in life. It found adult fC'ar of heights in 18%) of the control group but only 3% of the group that had experiL'nced a fall early in life. Those \">'ith hypophobia early in life still had deficient anxiety decades later (Poulton, Davies, Menzies, Langley, & Siha, 1998) . Anxiety illustrc1tes the diversity of the body's regulation mechanisn1s (Barlow, , 1 9H8; Marks, 1987; Poulton & Menzies, 2002; Stein & Bouwer, 1997) . For instance, rigid defensive responses to fixed cues, such as chicks hiding from hawk-shaped shadows, are useful when a correct response to the first encounter is esscntiat but they n:sult in many false alarms and do not protect against novel dangers. Fll'xible learning mechanisms protect against novel cbngcrs but may fail during a crucial initial exposure, and they are prone to result in phobias. SociallC'arning is another solution. Infzmt rhesus monkeys show no innate fear of snakes; hmvever, a single observation of another monkey displaying fear of snakes induces longlasting <woicbncl'. Wutching another monkey display fear of a fluwer induces no such fc,ar (Mineka, KC'ir, & !'rice, 1980) . Exposu rl: treatment is effective for phobias, but the fear rcsponst' is not un-leamC'd (Borlow, 19k8; Foa, Stekl'lce, & Ozarow, 1905; Marks & Tobena, 1990 ). Instead, a new cortical process suppresses the fear response (Quirk, 2002) . Exposure to dzmger disrupts this suppression. Thus, the great flood in Moscow caused the reemergence of previously extinguished fears in Pavlov's dogs. This rnay rdlcct a constraint in a path-dependent mechanism; simple• unlearning apparently may be in1possiblc•.
Otlwr fears cannot bv Pxtinguished. For instilncc, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) illustrates Olw-time Jparning of the strongest sort. A single !ifc-thn'<ltcning experience induces a subsequent terror response to any cue that suggl'sts a recurrence of the dangerous situ<ltion (Breslau, Davis, & Andreski, 1995). Proxi-Inate science is steadily honing in on the mechanisms that account for this syndrome (Pitman, 1989; Yehuda, Halligan, Colit>r, Grossman, & Bierer, 2004) , but it has lwen morL' difficult to find ways to diffen•ntiate altf'rnative evolution<1ry hypotlwses. PTSD could result from damage to JncchanisJns not desiplC'd to copl' \vith such extreme situations. Howe\'er, nearly dying is so important to fitness that it might well havL' sharwd a one-time learning mcchunism th<lt gives rise to the symptoms of postiT<lUHlatic stress that might Iwlp prevent a recurrence.
Fear has distinct subtypes that St.'l'ITI to have been partially differentioted from generic clnxiE'ty to cope with domain-specific challenges (M,1rks & Nessc, 1994) . For instance, p<lnic flight is just the ticket to l'Scupc from a prcdutor, but frozen immobility is superior whl'n teetpring on a cliff. Soci,ll anxiety is present in most peopk (Cilbcrt, 2001; Leary & Kowalski, !99'i) , and pcopk wbo l<Kk it are often insuffl'rabk', even if tlwy do not qualify for a psychiatric diilgnosis. WL' wonder how they would ha\'e fared in small hunkr-gatht..'rer groups. The char<lctl'ristics of subtypes of c1l1Xil'ty m.1p vvcll onto the challenges posed by diffen'nt threats.
The smoke dl:tl'ctor principlL' helps to explain sonw apparent pcculiaritiL'S of the nwch<tnisms that regulatl' anxiety and other defL•nses (Nesse, :2.005; Stein & Buuvv·er, 1997) . Because nwst ,1nxiety rcsponsL'S arL' incxpensi\·e and protect against huge potential harms, an optimal system will express many alarms that are unnecessary in the particular instance, but nonetheless perfectly norn1al. This suggests that using drugs to block defenses may be safe in most instances but that in some situations blocking a defense may be fatal.
Mood Disorders
The utility of sachwss and depression is less obvious than for anxiety, but Bib ring CI 953) long ago suggeste-d that depression signaled the need to detach when libido persists in a connection to an unre\varding object. Hamburg, Hamburg, and Barchas (1975) and Klinger (1975) described how L'motions regulate goal pursuit more generally, with inability to reach a goal first arousing aggrct-Jsive attempts to overcoml' an obstacle, then low mood motivating disengagement. If the person docs not give up, the m'gative affect escalates into depression. This principle, nmv confirmed by much research ( Brickmtm, '19H7; Carver & Scheier, 1990 , 1998 Emmons & King, 1988; Janoff-BulmcH1 & Brickman, 1982; Little, 1999; Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2003) , provides the foundation for a 1nore general approach to n1ood as a mechanism that allocates effort proportionzll to propitiousness (Ncsse, 1991b (Ncsse, , 2000 . When payoffs are high, positive mood increases initiative and risk-taking. \Vhcn risks are substantial or effort is likely to be vvastcct lovv n1ood blocks in\'estments. In this perspective, ordiniJry episodes of sadness and low mood motivate ch,1nging behavioral strategies (Watson & Andrews, 2002). If no alternative is found <1nd the goal is essentict!, persistenn~ may result in depression (Klinger, 1975; Wrosch, Scheier, & Carver, 2003) .
Observations of chickens and monkeys \vho lost their positions in the hicr<trchy have suggested a view of depression as "involuntary yielding" thilt protects against continuing attack (Cilbert 1992; Sloman, Price, Gilbert, & Gardner, 199·1). This is consistent with dcltZl shovving that stressful events cause dL'pression mainly if they are char,lCtcrizcd by humiliation and/or being trapped in an impossible quest (G. W. Brmvn, l:--Iarris, & Hepworth, 1995; Kendlcr, Hcttema, ButL'ra, Gardner, & Prescott, 2ClrJJ). Also related is the suggestion that sex diffL'fl'l1Cl'S in ckpn:ssinn may Jrisc from the male tendency to strive for position i.lnd resources, lc<1ving many women vulnerable to depression because they huve fewer options (Gilbert, 1992; WL'ncgrat, 1Sl9S) .
Deprt'ssion has also been vie\.ved as a social m;:mipulation (HagL'n, 2002; VVatson & Andrews, 2002) . Hagen sees postpartum depression as a "blackmail threat" to abandon the infant, but otlwr theories can ;·dso l'xplain thL' association of postpar-tu_m depression \Vith poor resourres and relationships. fn a n'lated but more general view, Watson <llld /\ndrews (2002) suggest that depression facilitates "socicd naYig<ltion" by signaling that current strategies are failing <Jnd nevv' directions arc needed. This approach echoes psychoanalyst Emmy Cut's (19H9) work on productive and unproductive elL-pression. Nettle (2004) notes inadequacies of the social navigation hypotlwsis and emphasizes the possible adaptive value of neuroticism.
DL'Catanzaro (19.SO) proposed that suicide can bt~ adaptive if an individuJ.l has no chance for rq;roduction but can increilst: future reproduction of kin by ceasing to use resources that they could usc instead. DiJta showing that suicides are more conunon in old <llld sick pl'ople are consistent; hmvever, alternative' explanations are m·ailabh:, separation from kin docs not protect against suicide, and there are no animal examples. In a rt'\'crsc twist on lhis perspective', the benefits of social support result more from hl'lp given than help received. lndi\·iduals who provide help to others have higher mood ;:1nd incrL'ascd longc•vity (R. Brmvn, Dahll'n, Mills, Rick, & Biblarz, 1999; S. L. Brown, Nessc, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003) . The role of the group is also central toN. B. Allen and Badcock's (2003) model, in which people carefully monitor what they can contribute to a group. People who realize they can contribute little retreat into depression that is hypothesized to prevent active expulsion frmn the group.
These approaches are guitC' different from the prevalent view that depression is a brain disorder (Andreasen, 1984; Valenstein, 1998; Wolpert, 1999) . The brain mechanisms that mediate 1nood certainly can go awry, but two questions neC'd consideration. First, is low mood a useful response like cough or ,111 abnormality unrelated to defenses like epileptic seizures? Second, do individual differences in vulnerability to depression arise n1ainly fronl primary brain differences or from brain changes mediated by social experience (C. W. Brown & Harris, 1978; Mon· roe & Sin1ons, 1991) ? These are not mutually exclusive alternatives, and most depression is best understood as the outcome of gene x environnwnt interactions (Caspi ct a!., 2003) . Also, there arc different routes to depression, some of which progress irrespective of environment, others of which arise from life circumstances, perhaps especially those invoh'ing pursuit of unreachable goals.
Other Emotional Disorders Anxiety and dE'pn•ssion get all the atlt'ntion, but every emotion is subject to at least two kinds of disorckr: excesses or deficits. For instance, pathological jealousy is common, but few clinicians know why jealcmsy exists (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semml'lro1h, 1992) . Jealousy may arise for good reasons (Buss et al., 1999) or from delusions. Feelings of inadequacy make son1e men think that their partners might \veil prefer someone else <lnd then that they do prefer someone else. Depression treatml'nt often relieves pathological jealousy (Stein, Hollander, & Josephson, 1994) . The syndrome of pathological lack of jealousy has yet to be described.
Comparable pathologies exist for every C'n1otion. People arc t<lkcn over by envy, love, suspicion, anger, awe, or rapture. Whether it is normal or abnormnl depends on the situation. I<ecognizing the evolutionary origins and functions of emotions provides a framework for describing their disorders and the longsought scientific basis for distinguishing emotional disorders from emotions that are si1nply unwanted.
BEI-IAVJORAI_, DISORDERS
Other disorders involve inability to control behavior. Most obvious arc the add ictions and other habits, but other proble1ns of behavioral control range from e<Jting disorders to violence.
Addictions The human toll taken by addictions is magnified bec;-mse their effects harm others as well as the addict. A whole iss1w of Addiction \Nas devoted to l'\'olutionary approachE'S (Hill & Newlin, 2002) , with suggestions about the adaptive significance of oddiction (Sul!iv,ln & Hagen, 2002) , life· history thc,,rv (Hill & Chow, 2002) , and the significance of fermentation (Dudley, 2002) , among others. One of the most important evolutionary insights is simplt>, hmve\'L'f. Learning is chemically mediated, so exogenous subst.1nccs e<m din'ctly stimulate rl'\-vard n1echanisms (Nesse, 1994; Nesse & Berridge, 1997) . The subjective sensations arc pleasurable, and the associated reinfurcemcnt incn.·a:-.vs the frequency of drug-taking behavior. Aversive withdrawal sympton1s become cues that stimulate further drug taking. Over time, the subjective pleasurable "liking" wanes, the withdravval effects become more severe, and the habit strength of "·wanting" increases, trapping the addict in a vicious cycle that may offer little pleasure, even as it consumes most of what is valuable in life.
VuLnl'rability to substance abuse results from our novel environn1cnt. The aY,lilahility of pure chen1icals and clever routes of achninistration increase the ratL' of drug taking. Tobacco administered via the technological advance of cigarettes is the must widespread and harmful addiction, vvith alcohol a close second. The so-c1lll'd bard drugs of abuse, such as amphetamine and cocaine, act even more directly on ascending dopamine tracts to establish addiction. Sub-stancL' dbuse is a universal human vulnerabillty to drugs that hijack reward mech,ln isms.
VVhy peoplL~ differ in vulnerability is a fundamentally different question. Those \-vho find it difficult to quit have different gcnl'S and more psychiatric syn1ptoms (Ponwrleau, FN7). The responsible genes arc not "defective"; they GlUSL'd no harm until the modern t'nvironment. Other vulnerability factors arise ~ from cnvironnwntal exposures, such as adverse circumstances that arouse aversive emotions that increase the reinforcing properties of drugs.
Ha [;if::; Vulnerabilities to otlwr habits have related evolutionary explanations. Carnbling dot'S not directly influence brain chemicals, but it is as potent for son1e people clS heroin. Men without other options may take big risks to get a possible big rt'\Vt"lnt thus possibly t'xplaining why poor people 1non.' often plaY the lottery.
Gambling is a bigger problem for men than 1-vomen, probably because over evolutionary history substantial resources brought increased mating success for men n1on' than women. The tendency to persist in games of chance with known long-tcrn1 negative payoffs, such as slot machines, reflects the distortions built into human decision making (Kahnen1an, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982) . Similarly, our cvoJ·vcd bch,wior regulation mechanisms lead to n1uch other nonadaptive behavior in modern environments such as watching pornography, going to prostitutes, habitu<ll web brovvsing, reading cheap novels, and engaging in private rituals, such <lS organizing and reorganizing a collection of stamps or coins.
Entinx Oi,<ordcrs Half of iunC'ricans are now overwc•ight, and a third arc clinically obe~t:. They spc'nd billions on books and treatment, but nothing works very well. Vast amounts of research have tried to understand what is wrong with the heavy half. An evolutionary appro,1ch suggests a different question: Why are we all vulnerable to obesity? A silnpk answer is that our behavior regulation mechanisms wcrl' ~hapcd in the very different environment of the African savannah where the penalt}· for eating too little was swift and fa_tal. Even when food was plentiful, obesity' remained rare bt•cause choices were li1nitcd and getting food involved burning as many calories per day as a modern aerobics instructor (Eaton, Shostak, & Konrwr, 19HH) .
Attempts to control \veight by willpowL'r leod to the other eating disorders, anorexia llLT\'OS<l and bulin1ia. Adaptive explanations for anorexia as a \·ariant mating str<1tegy h,wc been suggested (Sur bey, 1987; Voland & Voland, 1989) . Hmvevcr, a simpln c.:L1rting place is the nhs0rv<1tion that these disorders usually hegln with strenuous diets. Such diets cause episodes of gorging, a hallmark of bulimiJ, but life-saving during famine. Gorging precipitates shame, feelings of lack of control, more intense fear of obesity, and new resolutions in a vicious cycle of escalating anorexia and bulimia. Eating disorders are also fostered by the intense mating competition in large social groups, augmented by media images that make real bodies seem inadequate. In light of the pervasiveness of mating competition, this makes perfect sense (Buss, 1988 (Buss, , 1994 . As \vith other syndromes, vulnerability varies for many reasons.
Sexual Disorders Civcn its in1portancc, you might think selection would have n1ade sex foolproof. Instead, it exe1nplifies tl1e vulnerabilities of .:1 trait shaped by . . . . ntultiple strong forces of .'-.election (Troisi, 2003) . For instance, men compbin about premature orgus1n while \Vornen cmnplain about lack of orgasm .. Why? Sex differences in br<.lin nwchanisn1s and differences in anatomic proximity to stimulation, yes, but these are proxi1n<1tc explanations. VVhy is the syskm so poorly designed for mutu<ll satisf<Jction? Because selection docs not shape mechanisms for n1utual sCJtisfaction. Women who had orgasms very quickly might well have had fewer children, as might men \Vho dallied too long when intcrruptiun is likely. This is consistent ·with the observation th<:1t premature ejaculation is <l problt>1n mainly for men \Vho an• young or fearful.
Another dram,ltic sex difference is 1.vhat it takes to initiate <HOUS<ll. For many men, the answer is almost any sexual cue, anytinw, any\vlwre (Symons, "1979) . Pornography is a male pursuit; even magazines thi1t display male bodies Jre bought mainly by men. Then there is the related problematic issue of why such a wide range of stimuli arouses men. We might suppose that sdectiun would ensure th;1t men want only potcntia.tly fertile partners, and most do. However, about 2qi~) ,1tT l'Xclusively homosexual, others are preoccupied \Vith immature girls, and many hdvc fantasy lives that involve domin;1tion or a fetish objt.>ct. One explanation may be ,1n error managpmcnt theory for why men so system<ltically and optimistically distort the intentions of wonwn (Hasdton & Buss, 2000) . As for why so many indJ,·iduals an.' exclusively hon1osexual, this remains unanswered, but not for want of tlwurics (Ruse, 19R8) . BRAIN DIS( lRln-:n.s Public relations campais'11s, many supportt.•d by pharmaceutical companies, promote the view that n1ental disordt.'rs ;uc brain disorckrs. This is necessarily true in the sense that brain changes medi,1tc zdl emotion i1nd behavior. However, slogans such as "depression is a brain disease" leave the mistaken impression that brain abnormalities arc always the primary causes and that drugs are the only appropriate trt.'atm~:.:nt. For son1e disorders such as schizophrenia, bipobr disorder, and autism, brain abnormalities are indeed ihc primary and usually sufficient cause. Other disorders, however, c<Jn ocn1r in a brain that is perfectly normal or a br<lin that was nonnal until it experienced unnatural stimuli such ,1s psychological tr<~uma, drugs of abuse, severe dieting, or trying to work in a hostile bureaucracy. As noted already, an evolutionary pt.'rspectivc fosters a sophisticated .1sscssnwnt of the many bctors that explain individual differences. Snnw mental disordL'rs are normal aversive emotions, others are dysrcgulated emotion:-:;, <Jnd some ;:uisL' from Evolutionary Psyclzology and Mental Hmltlz 917 factors only distantly related to the normal regulation of en1otions, cognition, and behavior (Nesse, 1984) . We turn to this last group to see what an evolutionary view can offer. Schizophrcni11 Schjzophrenia is the most serious comn1on mental disorder. The symptoms have little to do \Vith a "split n1ind" but instead H'flcct a systematic breakdown of perception, cognition, and emotion (Jablcnsky, Satorius, & Ern berg, 1992) . While precursor syn1ptoms can usually be detected, fulJ-flcdgL'd psychosis most often begins just as the individual is trying to establish an individual identity in a social group. i\..1any patil'nts first feel excluded, then suspicious, then frankly paranoid with delusions that others arc trying to harm them. Datil shm.ving strong influences of genetic factors Jnd brain changes hm·c' convinced most researchers that the schizophrenias (there an' multiple disordL'rs) JIT best understood as the manifestations ofhr,1in abnorn1alities. Some have suggestl'd Jdaptivc functions for symptmns of schizophrenia (J. S. Allen & Sarich, 198H; Feicrman, 19H2; jarvik & Chadwick, 1972) , but little evidence supports this idc,l.
Delusions and hallucinations <lrC not part of the routine experience of most humans. They are more like sei7lllTS ,1nd quite unlike <tdaptivc defenses such as fever, cough, or anxiety. Schizophrcni;1 prevalence Lltes <.Hc consistent at about 1% across cuHures (J,1blcnsky ct al., 1992) , undermining the idL'a th<lt novelty explains psychosis. There is zdso strong cvidenct> that schizophrenics hJvc lm.ver than average RS: .3 of avL~rage for m,1les and .5 for femtdcs {AviLl, Thaker, & Adami, 2()(Jl; Pulver l't aL, 2004). The same data show no incrca~cd fitness of their close rt'lativcs, arguing against any st'lective benefit manifest in otl;s'r individuals. It ha.s lwen suggesh~d th;1t schizophrenia nli.lY persist "because it is the unattractivl', low-fitness cxtn•nw of a highly variable InenLll trait that evolved ,ls a fitness ('good gpnes') indicator through mutual mate choice" (Shilncr, Miller, & Mintz, 2004) . Also, as mentioned aln·ady, infection has been implicated as an explanation for some cases of schizophrenia.
Tradc-uffs Jnd the limits of natural selection mJy be import.1nt. Schizophrenia is not a uni\'t:rsal human trait like the appendix; it is a rare syndrome. The evolutionary question is why natural scledion has not elin1in<1ted such fitness-reducing gem·tic variations. There art' many possibilities. Selection might not be pcnvcrful enough to purg" rccurrL'nt deleterious mutations from the gene pool. This is un-Jikl'ly bl'causc the uniformity of incidence across cultures argul'S against a muLltion occurring in the past 100,000 years, long enough to purge most seriously deleterious mutL1tions. Another possibility is that so 1nany genes are involved that sclccti,)n can act on them only ·weakly. A n'Llted perspccti\'l' is that normalizing selection can never shape a desib'll parameter to an extremely narrow zone (Keller, in press). Even traits coded for by only ,1 few genes are products of inkraclions \Vith other gcnl'S ,1nd environmental factors that introduce substi.lntial variation, leaving some individual:-; Jt maladaptive c'xtreincs.
A phylogcrwtic perspectivl' ofkrs rl'latcd explanations. Human c<1pacities for language and social cognition have ndvanced at a lightning p<tcc in the past 100,000 .vc,us, almost certainly bccausL' thL'Y offer major fitness ,1dvantages (Humphrey, "1976) . Such strong selection has costs that might \">'ell predispose to serious problctns (Crow, 1997) . Schizophrenia genes might also spread if tlwy are linked to ~trongly beneficial genes lBurns, in press), but pll\iotrupic effects arc more important. Cliff-edge effects offer a related possibility. For instance, racehorse breeding has resulted in longer and thinner leg bones that increase speed but are increasingly prone to fracture. If son1e mental characteristic gives increasing fitness up to a point where catastrophic failure becomes a problem, such cliffedge effects could account for the genetic patterns seen in schizophrenia and n1anic-deprcssive illne:-;s (Ncsse, 2005) .
The same lines of reasoning apply also to other seven_' mental diseases that also have an incidence of tlbout 1 in lOO·~autism in particular. Baron-Cohen (2002) has suggested that the manifestations of autism arc examples of a pathological extreme of cognitive styles that ore typically male. Thb would help to explain the ·~predominance of males who get the disorder.
Otlwr hypotheses also tksen:c consideL1tiun. For inst,1ncc, it bas bc'L'n confirm,:d rl'ccntly that tlw rates of schizophrenia increase drt.1m,1tically for childn'n who \..VL'n: conceivL·d \Vhen their fathers vverc over ·10 (By·rnc, Ag<.:'rbo, E1.vald, Ec1ton, & Mortl'nsen, 2003; M,1laspina el al., 2002) . Cencs transmitted by the mother have divided only 24 timl'S pl'f generation, com}hlH'd to SOU cell divisions for the DNA in sperm of older L1tlwrs, suggesting thilt many cases of schizophrenia arisl' from recurring Ill'W mutations. Among other implications, this falsifies the idea that \.VOnwn chooSl' older men to gl't good genes.
Obse;;sivc-COJilpiil:;itll' Disorder ()bsessivc-cmnpulsive d isordl;r (()CD) also shows subsL.lntial heritability and ,1 l'X1 incidence. Tlw condition is characterized by ritualistic rq_tctitive bt>h,wiors and fears that sonw small O\'l'rsight willlc,ad to disaster. People 1vith OCD tend to have <l smaller than normal e<1udate nucleus in the pons, and as already nott.'d, some cases result from an autoilnmune reaction to streptococcal infection (Swedo, Lc•tmard, Gan'l'y, & Mittleman, 1996) . It rcn1,1ins uncl'rLlin if OCD is dysrcgulation of useful nwchanisn1s or if it is something entirely separate (Rapoport & Fiske, 1998 ).
ATITNTION DJSOJ.;:DERS
The cvolution,ny origins of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have been the focus for several articles suggesting possible functions (Baird, Stevenson, & Williams, 2000; Brody, 2ll01; jensen eta!., 1997; Shcll<•y-Trcmblay & Rosen, 1996) or th,1t it is a facultative adaptation to certain environments (Jensen et al., 1997) . The striking male bias of the sex ratio, over 5 to 1, gives hints that ADHD 1nay simply be the extreme end of a continuum on which males tend to be higher than females, much akin to a reet:nt suggestion about <mtism (Baron-Cohen, 2002) . In the ancestral en\·irunnwnt, a tendency to move quickly to a new activity when current efforts ,1re unproductive' is a foraging strategy that may pay off 1nnre for hunting males than gatlwring females. As for the capacity to sit in one place indoors for hours under L'nforced contact \Vitll a boring book, that is t-iO far frmn anything the natural l'nvironment ever required, it is astounding that any of us can do it. The heritability of ADHD is high, and associations with candidate genes, notably DRD-l, offer promising leads (Biederman & Spencer, 19Y9). Because the 71\ allele is common and in ;-,trong linkage disequilibrium, it mJy ho\'e experienced recent positive seiL•ction (Crady ct al., 2003) .
RELAT!ONSHIP DIFF!CULTIES
The enormous importance of relationships in causing (and occasionally curing) n1ental disorders is so obvious that it _is easy to neglect its significance. Mental health professionals often bclit'Ve thot normal relationships are worm, loving, and ba~cd. on moral and emotional cmnn1itrnents. VVould that it were ~o. By contrast, an evolubonary view of reL1tionships emphasiZl'S the costs and pzryoffs of different social strategies in Lcrn1s of resources, reciprocal hdp, or inclusive fitness that can explain most tendencies to <1Hruism (Fiske, 1992; l-lindc', 1979; Hofer, 1984; Kirkpatrick, 1998) . Evolutionary approaclll's hmie aLso emphasized the prevalence of deceptive strategies and self-deception (Krebs & Dawkins, 19H4; Lnckard & Paulhu~, "1988; I-\ue, '\994; Slavin & Kriegman, 1992; Trivcrs, 20UO) , thus opening a littk-travl'lcd avenul' betwet>n EP ,1nd psychoanalysis. Other ch<lpters in this Handl100k shm-v how selection shapL'd the lllL'Chtmisms that nwdiatc rcL1tionships, knovvledgt' crucial to understanding hovv· relationships go vvTong.
Scxu,1l relationships and strategies have been a focus for EP, and the results of that research arc ripe for application to clinical situations (Buss, 1994; Buss & Malamulh, 1996) . For species \'\'ith mating systems similar to those of hunt.:ms, careful choice nf partners benefits females more th<ln males, und efforts to get milny matings lwnefit females n1on: than mah•s. As a result, sexual jL',llousy is morL' intense for n1ah•s, ,1nd opposition to maks giving resources to others tl'nds to bP greater for women (Buss & Schmitt, 199] ). Moreover, as every grandmother knlH·VS, the facts of prq:;nancy and mzdc' jealousy makL! short-term nwtings less costly and predictably more common in malt•s.
Cltild Abuse Child abuse has been a major focus for mental lwalth preVL·ntion and trcatmL'nt. Understanding the l'\'olutionary origins and functions of attachment has helped to explain why most parents do not abusL' their children despite provocations (Bowlby, 1984) . /-\n evolutionary perspective n1otivated two bch<Jvior'-11 ecologists to ask the now-obYious question: b child abuse mort' common in f<lmilies with a stepparent? Their a~tounding result is that death <1t t-he hands of parents is .SO times more common if there is a sh•pparcnt in the hcmsL' (Daly & Wilson, . This finding is com_rnnnly presented in a context franwd by the tc'ndency of m<.1lcs in many species to kill all unwca1wd inhnts shortly ,1ftcr they take oVL'r a fem;:1lc mating group (I-I rely, ]977). I lowcver, tlw mating pattL•rn of humans docs not routinely involH' males fighting to take ovt•r a harem \Vith multiple fcrna[es ·who clTL' nursing inf.lnts, SO tJW clnaJogy is incorrL'Ct. lnstl>ad, thL' mt'chanisms that protect babies in familiL'S with two related parents seem more prone to fail in n•constituted families (GC'llcs & Lancastc'r, 1987).
CONCLUSIONS
All it \\'Otlld take is discovery of a single cure. Even discovery of the definitive caust' for a single illness would do. If EP let1ds directly to such a treatment or discovery, it will grovv quickly. Is this Z! legitimate hope? Superficially, the ansvvcr is no. Instead of explanations for why some individuals gd sick c1nct others do noC EP explains wl1y mechanisms arc the vvay they ,:ne and vvhy natural selection has not eliminated the genl'tic \·,1riatinns that result in disease for so1ne. Its most profound contribution is a solid framework for understanding hovv behaviors are regulated to accomplish the many conflicting tasks of life, from getting food and surviving, to finding mates and protecting children. Instead of vic,wing one kind of life as normal and others as deviations, it sees the inherent conflicts in relationships, the struggles that go on in groups, and the dilemiTI<lS every person faces to allocate efforts among a host of competing needs. Far from providing a rigid and cold perspective, c:m evolution<1ry vievv fosters deepl'r e1npathy for the challenges we all face and deeper amazement that so many people arc able to find loving relationships, meaningful \.Vork, and a \Vay to juggle a bevy of responsibilities with good humor and even joy.
Does this presage a new kind of psychotherapy? There certainly are major iinplications for how to do psychotherapy (Cilbert & Bailey, 2000) and psychoanalysis (Slavin & Krieg1nan, 1992) , but they do not constitute a new kind of therapy competing with hundreds of others. Every kind of therapy should n1ake use of evolutionary principles. The juggernaut now is psychopharmacology, soon to be united with genetics to yield nt:w methods for tnanipulahng c_motions and behavior that we cannot yet imagine. In the near future, they should yield more effective treJtments for schizophrenia <lnd manic-depressive illness. Evolutionary investigations can assist in these quests by defining phcnotypt's and identifying evolved behavior regulation tnechanisms. These same gt·nctic ,1nd pha.rmat:ologic technologies will make it easier to 1nanipulate normal <lS \·veil as abnorm<ll l'tnotions. Tlwir focus exclusively on proximate perspectives holds tlw risk that we will block negative emotions and promote positive ones cYen before \VC grasp why they exist 11t all. Cautionary tales ;1bound. For instance, vv·hen cortisol was first discovered, it was used to relieve the symptcnns of <~11 kinds of infL:1mn1<1tion. It worked like a miracle and patients felt better, so why not? Jn a few years, however, the serious consequences of blocking these normJ.l reactions became clt,ar.
An evolutionary view of 1nental disorders docs not nwan acn·pting the pains and difficulties of the hum<Jn condition. Many Cln be prcventc>d or eliminated safely, but only when we better understand the functions of nl'gative emotions. Furthermore, a signal detection analysis of their regulation suggests that in many situations they are about as useful as pain after surgery. It is l'ven cmKeivdbJe that the personality tendencies that foster envy and bitter competition, to say nothing of violence, migl1t we'll be n1odifiahle. None of this \Vill be simph', however. Moreover, every such new major capacity for intervention \vill be far safer and more sensible if developed in a sophisticated evolution<uy context.
